Partners in Awareness
Information Sharing

- JCC Directorate
  - Command & Control

- Federal Agencies
  - Support

- Police Departments
  - Operations

- Security
  - Contract Services
Session Objectives

- Identify target specific threats
- Understand the 3 R’s
- Develop awareness of the event security infrastructure
- Conduct risk assessment for assigned area of responsibility
- Develop behavioral assessment skills
- Enhance recognition of IED components
- Establish the fundamentals of good reporting
- Identify risks related to IEDs and active shooters
Target Specific Threat

Who are they?

- International extremists
- Domestic extremists
- Racially motivated
- Criminals
Target Specific Threat

FBI Arrests Four Men in Bomb, Missile Plot
Target Specific Threat

Holocaust Museum Incident
Target Specific Threat
1. Surveillance
2. Elicitation
3. Security Probes
4. Acquiring Supplies
5. Suspicious Subjects
6. Dry Run
7. Deploying Assets / Staging
Signs of Terrorist Activity

1. Surveillance

2. Elicitation

3. Security Probes

4. Acquiring Supplies

5. Suspicious Subjects

6. Dry Run

7. Deploying Assets / Staging
Signs of Terrorist Activity

1. Surveillance
2. Elicitation
3. Security Probes
4. Acquiring Supplies
5. Suspicious Subjects
6. Dry Run
7. Deploying Assets / Staging
Signs of Terrorist Activity

1. Surveillance
2. Elicitation
3. Security probes
4. **Acquiring Supplies**
5. People Who Don't Belong
6. Dry Runs
7. Deploying Assets / Getting Into Position
Signs of Terrorist Activity

1. Surveillance
2. Elicitation
3. Security Probe
4. Acquiring Supplies
5. Suspicious Subjects
6. Dry Run
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7. Deploying Assets / Staging
Be aware of surveillance
  - Mobile
  - Fixed
Pre-Attack Surveillance

You are being observed.
Mobile Surveillance

Characteristics:

- Conducted on foot and from moving vehicles
- Vehicles and attire will fit the environment
Fixed Surveillance

Characteristics:

- Conducted on foot and from vehicles and buildings
- Same vehicle multiple days, different vehicles different days, same person(s) subsequent days, or the same person in different attire, or use of a team approach.
7 Signs Summary

- Be aware of surveillance
  - Mobile
  - Fixed

- Recognize people soliciting unusual information
  - Questions about security
  - Who is present after hours
7 Signs Summary

- Be aware of surveillance
  - Mobile
  - Fixed

- Recognize people soliciting unusual information
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  - Who is present after hours

- Identify security probes
  - Access without badge
  - Trying doors other than main access
7 Signs Summary

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- Identify security probes
  - Access without badge
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- Recognize suspicious subjects
  - Loitering
  - Taking photos of security operation
  - Sitting in a vehicle for long periods of time
7 Signs Summary

- Be aware of surveillance
  - Mobile
  - Fixed
- Recognize people soliciting unusual information
  - Questions about security
  - Who is present after hours
- Identify security probes
  - Access without badge
  - Trying doors other than main access
- Recognize suspicious subjects
  - Loitering
    - Taking photos of security operation
    - Sitting in a vehicle for long periods of time
- Spot staging
  - Bags/vehicles being dropped or parked
Threat Types

Human Threat:
Improvised Explosive Device (IED)
1. **Recognize the Threat**
   - Isolate it
   - Articulate it

2. **React to the Threat**
   - Time for law enforcement?
   - Distance from threat?
The Three R’s

- Recognize
- Report
- React
Event Security Infrastructure

Decisions & Control
Investigate Reports
Act on Reports
Observe & Report

Secure Area

Site Control
LE Operations
Invest Support
JCC Event Management
Security Staff Volunteer

Responsibility:

- Access Control
- Walking patrols
- Event assistance
- Chaperone
Responsibility:

- Access Control
- Bag Screening
- Stationary posts
- Walking patrols
- Event assistance
- Communication with Law Enforcement
Sworn Law Enforcement

Responsibility:

- Presence / Control
- Arrest violators

- Resolve specialized tactical issues
Event Operational Center
Area Risk Assessment

**Primary Responsibility:** (secure area)
* Stadium / Athlete assembly points

**Secondary:** (just outside the secure area)
* Bus lots / General parking / Grounds

**Collateral:** (anything outside secondary area)
* Streets / Woods / Lots / Buildings / Routes surrounding the venue, and off-site locations and accommodations
Elevated Threat Area (1)

Arena
Elevated Threat Area (2)

Athlete Assembly Location
Elevated Threat Area (5)

General Parking
Elevated Threat Area (6)

Transportation Routes
Elevated Threat Area (7)

Off-site Locations
Elevated Threat Area (8)

Athlete Accomodations (commercial)
Criminal Mindset
Purpose:

- Crowd control
- Maintain secure area
- Allow visual screening
- Allow bag screening
- Identify potential threats
What am I looking for?

- Badges
- Concealment
- Unusual acts
- Avoidance
- Hands
- Heavy bags
Bag Screening: Intent

- Because you DON’T have x-ray vision!
Bag Screening: Case Study

Synopsis:

- Gaylord Memorial Stadium
- October, 2005
- Back-pack
- 2-3 pounds of TATP
- 1 death
- Potential threat: 84,000 fans
Bag Screening: Challenges

Resistance based on:

(with the law abiding citizen)

- Contrary personality
- Value extreme privacy
- See no benefit in screening

(with the criminal)

- Crime in progress
- Testing security system

Homeland Security
Bag Screening: Equipment
Bag Screening: Indicators

Indicators:

1. Weight
2. Bag Structure
3. Odor
4. Contents
Options:

- Clockwise
- Counter-clockwise
- Left to Right, then Up and Down
- Item by item screening
United States Government Accountability Office

Testimony
Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

For Delivery on:
Reported at 10:05 a.m. EDT
Wednesday, July 4, 2007

HOMELAND SECURITY
Preliminary Results Show Federal Protective Service’s Ability to Protect Federal Facilities Is Hampered By Weaknesses in Its Contract Security Guard Program

Statement of Mark L. Goldstein, Director
Physical Infrastructure Issues

GAO Accountability • Integrity • Reliability

GAO-08-859T

Homeland Security

Bomb Materials Smuggled into Fed Buildings
Test of Security Measures Reveals Lack Screening, Sleeping Guards, GAO Report Says

(CBS/AD) Last updated at 7:05 p.m. EDT

Federal investigators had no trouble smuggling bomb-making materials past ill-trained and poorly supervised guards at federal buildings, senators were told at a hearing Wednesday.

“This is the broadest indictment of a federal agency I have ever heard,” Sen. Joseph Lieberman, D-Conn., said of the Homeland Security Committee hearing on the performance of the Federal Protective Service, the office responsible for the safety of some 9,000 federal facilities. “This is really serious stuff.”

The committee, chaired by Lieberman, heard how Government Accountability Office investigators on 10 occasions carried the components for an improvised explosive device through checkpoints monitored by FPS guards, in all 10 cases the bomb-making materials went undetected.

CBS News correspondent Bob Orr reports that the components only cost $150 per bomb, and took just four minutes to assemble.

Mark Goldstein, the GAO’s director for physical infrastructure issues, said the investigators proceeded to assemble the material — made up of a liquid explosive and a low-order detonator — in restrooms and walked freely around the facilities with the IED in a briefcase.

He said that in some cases the bathrooms were locked but employees working in the buildings opened them up for the visitors.
IED Recognition

- Fragmentation
- Switch
- Container
- Explosive
IED Component: Container
IED Component: Explosive

- Cast Booster - TNT
- Detonating Cord
- TATP
- KinePak
- Black/Smokeless Powders
- Dynamite
- ANFO
- C-4
IED Component: Power Source

- Time Fuse
- Fuse Lighter
- Motorcycle Battery
- Polaroid Camera Battery
- Solar Power Systems
- Car Battery
- Rechargeable Battery packs

Categories:
- Electrical
- Non-Electrical
IED Component: Initiator

Non-Electrical
- Non-Electric Blasting Caps
- Time Fuse

Electrical
- Flash Bulb
- Christmas Tree Bulb
- Electric Match
- Commercial/Electrical Blasting Cap
- Military/Electrical Blasting Cap
IED Component: Switch

- Trembler
- Watch-Timed Devices
- Remote-Cell Initiated
- Toggle
- Pressure
- Integrated Circuit
- Mercury Activated
- Pull/Release
- Radio Frequency Activated Device
IED Delivery Methods

- VBIED
- WBIED
- PBIED
- IED

Area of Responsibility
The Three R’s

- Recognize
- Report
- React
React

Blast Matrix:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat Description</th>
<th>Explosives Mass* (TNT equivalent)</th>
<th>Building Evacuation Distance**</th>
<th>Outdoor Evacuation Distance***</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pipe Bomb</td>
<td>5 lbs 2.3 kg</td>
<td>70 ft 21 m</td>
<td>850 ft 259 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suicide Belt</td>
<td>10 lbs 4.5 kg</td>
<td>90 ft 27 m</td>
<td>1,080 ft 330 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suicide Vest</td>
<td>20 lbs 9 kg</td>
<td>110 ft 34 m</td>
<td>1,360 ft 415 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Briefcase/Suitcase Bomb</td>
<td>50 lbs 23 kg</td>
<td>150 ft 46 m</td>
<td>1,850 ft 564 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compact Sedan</td>
<td>500 lbs 227 kg</td>
<td>320 ft 98 m</td>
<td>1,500 ft 457 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sedan</td>
<td>1,000 lbs 454 kg</td>
<td>400 ft 122 m</td>
<td>1,750 ft 534 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passenger/Cargo Van</td>
<td>4,000 lbs 1,814 kg</td>
<td>640 ft 195 m</td>
<td>2,750 ft 838 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Moving Van/Delivery Truck</td>
<td>10,000 lbs 4,536 kg</td>
<td>860 ft 263 m</td>
<td>3,750 ft 1,143 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moving Van/Water Truck</td>
<td>30,000 lbs 13,608 kg</td>
<td>1,240 ft 375 m</td>
<td>6,500 ft 1,982 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-Trailer</td>
<td>60,000 lbs 27,216 kg</td>
<td>1,570 ft 475 m</td>
<td>7,000 ft 2,134 m</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Fundamentals = 5 W's**

- **Who** did I observe?
- **What** specifically did I see?
- **Where** did I observe the suspicious behavior?
- **When** did I observe the suspicious behavior?
- **Why** do I think the behavior is suspicious?

**Accurate = just facts**
ALWAYS report observations in a *timely* fashion!

Timely = ASAP

- BEFORE the situation changes
- BEFORE people leave, or alter their appearance
- BEFORE the incident occurs
Observations of persons:

- Hair Style/Length
- Race/Age
- Eyewear/Eye Color
- Facial Hair
- Clothing Color/Description
Reporting Activity

..walking or running away
Observations of Vehicles:

- Make / Model
- Vehicle Type
- Vehicle Color
- Unusual Characteristics (i.e. windows tinted)
- Registration
Session Summary

Terrorist IED Attack Timeline

- INTENT
- INITIAL PLANNING
- OBTAIN OPERATIONAL RESOURCES
- CONDUCT OPERATIONS
- ATTACK
- IMMEDIATE EFFECTS
- LONG-TERM EFFECTS

Alert presence
Eye contact
Greeting
Sound screening procedures
Session Summary

Terrorist IED Attack Timeline

- INTENT
- INITIAL PLANNING
- OBTAIN OPERATIONAL RESOURCES
- CONDUCT OPERATIONS
- ATTACK
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- LONG-TERM EFFECTS

Deter → Predict → Detect

- Avenue of approach
- Method of attack
- Vulnerabilities
Session Summary

Terrorist IED Attack Timeline

INTENT  INITIAL PLANNING  OBTAIN OPERATIONAL RESOURCES  CONDUCT OPERATIONS  ATTACK  IMMEDIATE EFFECTS  LONG-TERM EFFECTS

- Deter
- Predict
- Detect
- Suspicious vehicles
- Suspicious persons
- IED components

Homeland Security
Session Summary

Terrorist IED Attack Timeline

INTENT  INITIAL PLANNING  OBTAIN OPERATIONAL RESOURCES  CONDUCT OPERATIONS  ATTACK  IMMEDIATE EFFECTS  LONG-TERM EFFECTS

Deter  Predict  Defeat

➢ Report!
➢ Assist!
Session Summary

Terrorist IED Attack Timeline

- INTENT
- INITIAL PLANNING
- OBTAIN OPERATIONAL RESOURCES
- CONDUCT OPERATIONS
- ATTACK
- IMMEDIATE EFFECTS
- LONG-TERM EFFECTS

Deter  Predict  Mitigate

- Distance!
- Shielding!
Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty.

Wendell Phillips
Tom Walton / Ken Jaeger

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